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Nature of the Case
Plaintiff sues the defendants Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff
and county commissioners of Salt Lake County alleging damages
for the death of plaintiff's son, when the motorcycle the intoxicated decedent was operating, failed to negotiate a curve in
the road.

--Disposition In Lower Court
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Third Judicial District
court, granted defendants Motion to dismiss under 12(b) (6)
U.R.C.P,.
Facts
Inasmuch as the Lower Court granted defendants'
Motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Complaint fails
to state a cause of action (R-14)

the only facts for review

are those stated in the complaint.
The appellants' interjection of additional facts

(the

make and weight of the motorcycle, the distance to decedent's
home, etc.) are not properly included in appellant's Brief.
However, we will engage in the same impropriety by replying
that defendants' proof would establish that decedent indicated
he would push his motorcycle to a friend's home a short distance
away.
The above alleged additional facts are not material
to the dispositions of this appeal.
The Complaint establishes that the officers never
saw decedent while he was operating his motorcycle (background
facts, R-4).

Their first contact with him was in the parking

lot relative to a disturbance.
The decedent was not taken into custody by the officers.
"Despite Christenson's .
failed to arrest him"

. intoxication, both deputies

(Par 18,R-4).

The deputies "told" decedent

to walk his motorcycle away from that location"

-2-

(Par 16, R-4) ·

The decedent, while driving his motorcycle failed to
negotiate a curve and later died from the injuries he sustained.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
The Defendants Owed No Duty To Decedent
To Protect Him From His Own Negligence.
Not one case cited by appellant involves the facts
here.

All of the cases in point involve subsequent accidents

resulting in injuries or death of third parties, caused by
the drunk driver, after the officiers had observed him driving
while intoxicated, and failed to arrest him.
Inasmuch as no member of the general public was
injured by decedent's act in driving a motorcycle while intoxicated, the appellant's entire Brief is based on an argument
of facts in a different case, which the Honorable Court need
not here decide.
For Example:

Ryan v. State 656 P.2d 616 (Arz 1982)

(Appellant's Brief, Pg. 5) is obviously not in point.
a dangerous
plaintiff.

There

inmate escaped from a youth center and later shot
The trial court granted Summary Judgment based on

Governmental Immunity, and the Arizona Supreme Court reversed·
Adams v. State 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska, 1976) (Appellant's
Brief Pg.

5.), involves the duty of the state in conducting

fire safety inspections and is not germaine to the issues here.
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Shore v. Town of Stonington 444 A 2.d 1379 [Conn. 1982
(Pg. 7)] officers failed to arrest a drunk driver whom they
had previously stopped, but failed to arrest, was later involved in an accident resulting in serious injuries and death
of third parties.

The officers had warned the drunk to drive

carefully, and the accident occurred 10 minutes later.
Tomkins v. Kenner Police Dept.

402 So. 2.d 276 (La

1981), Appellant's Brief Pase 8 does not involve a failure to
arrest a drunk.

Rather the officers, during an investigation

of an accident, negligently failed to discover a seriously
injured party in the accident, and he died as a result.
Mach Co. v. Rensselar Water Co. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E.
896 (1928)

(Pg. 9, Appellant's Brief),

simply holds that a

contract by a water works company to furnish water to a city,
does not give an individual resident of the city a cause of
action against the water company when the resident's house
burns and the hydrant pressure was not sufficient to extinguish
the fire.
Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission. 381 P2.n 107
(Ariz. 1963)

(Pg. 12 Apf:Oell.ant's Brief), involves the incorrect

highway markings on a state highway which confused the driver
resulting in an accident.
Governmental Immunity.

The court abolished the defense of

The case, therefore, is clearly not

in point.
The Respondent's Position is clearly announced by this
Honorable Court in Benally v. L. G. Robinson 14 Utah .2d 6,
376 P.2d 388, 1964 (Appellant's Brief Pg. 11).
-4-

"Ordinarily

one has no duty to look after the safety of another who has
become voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited his ability
to protect himself.

But that absence of duty ended when

Officer Robinson took Benally into custody".
In the case at Bar the officers did not take the
decedent into custody.

The appellant complains that the

officers did not arrest him.
In Parvi v. City of Kingston (N.Y.)
(1977)

362 N.E.2d 960

(Pg. 15 Appellant's Brief) the officers responded to a

call of a disturbance, and upon arrival found three intoxicated
men.

The police told them to leave but were advised they had

no place to go.

The officers then transported them to a park

where they could "sleep it off".

Two of the men wandered on

to a near-by freeway and were struck by cars.
The Majority Court held that when the men were placed
in the police car, they were then in custody.
that Summary Judgment was not :r:iroper

The court held

as it would "negate the

very duty imposed on police officers when they took Parvi
into custody."

(emphasis added).

The better reasoned di3senting opinion denied the
findings of custody, under the facts, and then states Page 966:
"Plaintiff's negligence claim is equally without
merit.
The police officers had no duty to leave
Parvi absolutely free from danger in any form.
Instead, they owed plaintiff only a duty to exercise
ordinary care.
If Perchance, he was in search of
more drinks, there was no chance of giving him absolute safety except by locking him up.
It should
not be the rule, common to an era long well past, that
every drunkard must be locked up on being observed as
intoxicated in public."

-5-

"The police . .
or baby sitters."

• are not sisters of charity

In Stout v. City of Porterville 196 Cal. Rept'r 301
(1983) where officers questioned a pedestrian who was intoxicated, but did not arrest him, and the pedestrian was later
struck by a car, the pedestrian's complaint against the
officers and the city was dismissed.
The Appellate Court affirmed, and states,

Page 304:

"The only additional duty undertaken by
accpeting employment as a police officer is the
duty owed to the public at large."
The Stout Court points out that "As a rule, one has no
duty to come to the aid of another."
The court there cited considerable precedent pointing
out that until a "special relationship" is established by
an affirmative act by the officer "which places the person
in peril or increases the risk of harm" there arises no duty
on the officer to protect an individual.
The Court then concludes:
"Appellants did not allege that Officer
Semonious assured Michael Stout he would take
care of him or by his words or conduct induced
him to rely on the officer's protection.
Appellants did not allege that the officer in
any way induced him into a false sense of security.
In sum, appellants failed to allege a
common law legal duty owed to them by City and/or
Officer Semonious."
In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the
defendant officers took any affirmative action to place
decedent under their custody, or that they in any way took
any action which would have led decedent into a feeling of
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security, or that any action on their part increased the
posibility of harm to decedent.
Quite to the contrary, had decedent complied with
his agreement to "walk" the motorcycle and not ride it, no
accident would have occurred.
We, refer also to precedents cited in Defendant's
Memorandum Pg. R-17-19.
POINT II.
The Decedent's Negligence, as a Matter of Law
Under Comparative Negligence, Was Equal to or
Exceeded Any Possible Negligence on the Part of
These Defendants.
It is inconceivable that intoxication while driving
a motor vehicle can be advanced as an excuse for negligence,
as proposed by appellant.
It is even more ludicrous to submit that decedent who
was grossly intoxicated while driving a motorcycle without
the permission or knowledge of the defendant officers was less
negligent than the officers.
Reasonable minds cannot differ but that under the
facts alleged here, the decedent's negligence was certainly
the sole cause of the accident and his death.
But assuming arguendo that there was some passive
negligence on the part of the officers, the decedent's negligence as a matter of law far outweighed any such negligence
on the part of the officers.

-7-

Arn Jur.

2.d, New Topic Service, Comparative Negli-

gence at page 65.
. the comparative negligence statute did
not attempt to take from the court the right, where
no other inf erencE a:itlid be drawn from the evidence
by reasonable men, to decide as a question of law that
negligence on the part of the plaintiff equaled or
exceeded that of the defendant."
65A C.J.S., Negligence, §262, page 905:
"Where the facts are undisputed and conclusively establish that the degrees of negligence were
equal or that plaintiff's negligence exceeded that
of defendant, . . . the question of defendant's
liability should not be submitted to the jury."
CONCLUSION
It would be insurmountable and impossible task to
require police officer to protect all inebriates from the
possibility of irjuring them selves which is the contention
of appellant.
No duty to do so exists, and none existed under the
facts alleged in the complaint here.
And when a highly intoxicated person drives a motor
vehicle, contrary to law and reason, he can blame himself for
the obviously foreseeable consequences.
The Order of Dismissal should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted
TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

L. E. Midgley
Deputy County Attorney
Civil Division
Attorney for Defendants
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